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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being

charged

with felony possession

of a controlled

substance,

methamphetamine, Arnold Dean Anderson exercised his constitutional right to a jury
trial. He was found guilty of that charge, as well as a persistent violator enhancement,
and received a sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed.
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied him his right to
self-representation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857.
Mr. Anderson also asserts that his right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the district court summarily denied his request for
substitute counsel without providing Mr. Anderson a full and fair opportunity to explain
the conflict he had with his counsel, and it further erred in denying the motion.
Furthermore, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately six o'clock in the evening on July 18, 2013, Officer Matthew
Gonzales saw a pick-up truck driving backwards down a one-way street.

(Trial

Tr., p.151, L.22 - p.152, L.7.) He recognized the driver, Arnold Dean Anderson, and
suspected that Mr. Anderson was driving on a suspended license.

(Trial Tr., p.152,

L.14 - p.153, L.2; R., p.11.) After verifying with dispatch that Mr. Anderson's driver's
license was suspended, Officer Gonzales went to the house he saw Mr. Anderson
enter.

(Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.3-19.)

The house was one which had been divided into

1

several apartments.

(Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.22-24.) Officer Gonzales walked up to the

doorway of the first apartment, heard and saw Mr. Anderson, and asked Mr. Anderson
to step out of the apartment to speak to him. (Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.2-8, p.155, Ls.2-5,
p.156, Ls.15-21.)

Mr. Anderson came out and spoke to Officer Gonzales.

(Trial

Tr., p.156, Ls.19-21.) After telling Mr. Anderson that he could arrest Mr. Anderson for
the driving misdemeanor, Officer Gonzales asked Mr. Anderson what was in his
pockets. (Trial Tr., p.161, Ls.6-20.) Mr. Anderson began pulling various construction
items out of his pockets. 1 (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.14-16, p.222, Ls.5-1 ·1.) Officer Gonzales
testified that he saw something fall from one of Mr. Anderson's pockets onto the ground.
(Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.5-14.) The item was a plastic baggie containing a white substance
that later tested positive for methamphetamine.
p.203, Ls.10-13.)

(Trial Tr., p.163, L.24 - p.164, L.4,

Mr. Anderson was charged with felony possession of a controlled

substance and with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.32-35.)
Approximately one month prior to trial, on October 21, 2013, a hearing was held
on the prosecutor's notice of intent to offer evidence of Mr. Anderson's prior bad acts
under I.RE. 404(b). (10/21/13 Tr., p.3, Ls.10-11.) Although the State withdrew its Rule
404(b) notice at the hearing, Mr. Anderson's appointed counsel, Ben Andersen,
apprised the district court that he was having "difficulties" with Mr. Anderson wanting to
speak to him and that Mr. Anderson kept telling defense counsel that "he wants to

Mr. Anderson was renovating all of the apartments in the house. (Trial Tr., p.214,
Ls.10-16.) This included tearing out the old carpets and removing all of the trash from
the apartments. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.21-24, p.219, Ls.9-21.) Steven Stone had
previously helped Mr. Anderson with similar projects, and was there to help that day.
(Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.13-25, p.236, Ls.9-25.) Both Mr. Stone and Mr. Anderson testified
that the previous tenants had been drug dealers and/or drug users and they were
removing hypodermic needles and other assorted drug paraphernalia. (Trial Tr., p.218,
L.24 - p.220, L.13, p.237, Ls.10-15.)
1
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represent himself."

(10/21/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-22.)

some difficulty preparing for trial."

Counsel noted that "it is causing

(10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-2.)

Defense counsel

represented to the court that he had told Mr. Anderson that he would be able to address
that in court that day. (10/21/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.22-23.) The prosecutor then advised the
district court that Mr. Anderson had asked to represent himself in an unrelated case that
was pending. (10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.7-9.) Despite the representations by both defense
counsel and the prosecutor, the district court noted that it had not "seen anything" with
regard to Mr. Anderson's wish to represent himself and set Mr. Anderson's motion to
represent himself for Friday. (10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-15; R., p.97.) The district court
said, "let's get that issue addressed. If he wants to represent himself, that's his choice
we'll have the hearings and proceed."

(10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-20.).

Although the

motion was noticed for hearing, there was no hearing held and no indication as to why it
was vacated. 2 (R., pp.4-5, 97.)
A one day jury trial was held after which the jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of
possessing a controlled substance. (R., p.167.) Mr. Anderson stipulated that he had
been convicted of two felonies and was thus a "persistent violator" pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 19-2514. (Trial Tr., p.298, L.3 - p.302, L.1.)

In a letter dated February 4, 2014, that apparently had been written in response to a
letter the district court had received from Mr. Anderson, a district court clerk explained
that there was no hearing held on the Rule 404(b) notice as the prosecutor withdrew the
notice, and the clerk "could not tell [Mr. Anderson] why the Judge decided not to allow a
hearing on a motion for you to represent yourself." (R., p.194.) The next hearing was
held on Monday, October 28, 2013. (R., p.98.) The district court advised the parties
that it needed to move the trial date. (R., p.98.) Mr. Anderson advised the court that he
intended to hire a new attorney, Doug Nelson, to represent him, but he did not renew
his request to represent himself. (See, generally, 10/28/13 Tr.) The prosecutor again
pointed out that Mr. Anderson was representing himself in another case involving two
delivery charges. (10/28/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.)
2

3

Although Mr. Anderson's sentencing hearing was set for March 24, 2014, on
March 17, 2014, Mr. Andersen filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.189-274.) On March 24, 2014, the sentencing hearing
was continued to allow further discussions between Mr. Anderson and his new counsel,
Doug Nelson. (3/24/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-24.) On March 26, 2014, Mr. Anderson filed a

pro se Motion to Dismiss Counsel (Mr. Nelson) for being ineffective. (R., pp.277-281.)
Thereafter Mr. Nelson filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record. (R., p.282.) At
sentencing on March 28, 2014, Mr. Nelson advised the district court that Mr. Anderson
was initiating a post-conviction action against Mr. Nelson. (3/28/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.3-25.)
Mr. Nelson also advised that he was told by Mr. Anderson that he wanted to represent
himself. (3/28/14 Tr., p.6, Ls. ·16-21.) The district court denied both motions, stating its
reasons on the record, which had to do with not delaying the case any further. (3/28/14
Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.6.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Anderson to a unified sentence of 12 years, with
four years fixed. (R., p.290.) The sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to
his sentence in Twin Falls County case number 2013-0154. (R., p.290.) A Judgment of
Conviction was entered on March 28, 2014.

(R., pp.288-292.)

On April 3, 2014,

Mr. Anderson filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.299-301, 311-329.)
On March 28, 2014, the district court issued a written order denying
Mr. Anderson's prematurely filed I.C.R. 35 motion as nonjusticiable, where it was filed
before Mr. Anderson had been sentenced. (R., pp.293-295.)

4

ISSUES
1

Did the district court violate
Anderson's
the United
Constitution, Article I, § 13 of
Idaho Constitution,
regarding
Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, when it ignored his request to
his desire to represent himself at trial?

2.

Did the district court err when it failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry of
Mr. Anderson and his trial counsel upon Mr. Anderson's request for substitute
counsel, and when it failed to appoint substitute counsel for Mr. Anderson?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
upon Mr. Anderson in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. Anderson's Rights Under The Sixth Amendment To The
United States Constitution, Article I,§ 13 Of The Idaho Constitution, And Idaho
Code§§ 19-106 And 19-857 When It Ignored His Request To Be Heard Regarding His
Desire To Represent Himself At Trial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Anderson first attempted to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to

self-representation at a hearing held approximately one month before trial. Upon being
informed by defense counsel of Mr. Anderson's request, the district court noted that it
had not heard anything from Mr. Anderson about his concerns or his desire to represent
himself. (10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-15.) The district court did not direct any questions to
Mr. Anderson, but simply told the parties that it would set the matter for a hearing on
Friday during which time the court would hear Mr. Anderson's motion to represent
himself.

(10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20.)

However, the hearing was vacated without

explanation. (R., pp.4-5, 97.) The district court did not provide any reasoning or basis
for depriving Mr. Anderson of his right to self-representation.
Mr. Anderson asserts that his right to self-representation, under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution,
and Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, was violated when the district court essentially
ignored his requests to proceed prose. The violation of his right to self-representation
requires that his conviction be set aside, and this matter remanded for a new trial at
which his right to self-representation is honored.

6

The District Couri Violated IVlr. Anderson's Rights Under The Sixth Amendment
To The United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution, And
Idaho Code §§ 19-106 And 19-857 When It lqnored His Request To Be Heard
Regarding His Desire To Represent Himself
The Sixth Amendment to the United

Constitution, in relevant part,

provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. The Sixth Amendment
includes a right to self-representation when a person has knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his right to be represented by counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806 (1975).

Such a waiver is considered knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if the

person is "made aware of the
835.

Denial of the Sixth

requiring "automatic reversal."

of self-representation." Id.

and

right to self-representation is "structural error,"

v. United

527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).

Article I, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part provides, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right ... to appear and defend in person
and with counsel."

ID. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 13.

In State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860

(1989), the Idaho Supreme Court, interpreting both the Sixth Amendment and
Article I, § 13, held, "Ultimately, the decision of whether to exercise the right to counsel
or proceed pro se is for the defendant to make. The role of the trial court is simply to
ensure that where the defendant waives the right to counsel he or she does so
knowingly and intelligently."

Lankford, 116 Idaho at 865.

The opinion did not

differentiate between the similar provisions in both the federal and Idaho constitutions.
In addition to the Idaho Constitution's guarantee

of the

right to self-

representation, two Idaho statutes confer such a right. Idaho Code § 19-857 provides:
A person who has been appropriately informed of his right to counsel may
waive any right provided by this act, if the court concerned, at the time of
or after waiver, finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his
7

rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise
according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person's
age, education and familiarity with the English language and the
complexity of the crime involved.
I.C. § 19-857.

Additionally, Idaho Code § 19-106, in relevant part, provides, "In a

criminal action the defendant is entitled ... [t]o be allowed counsel as in civil actions, or
to appear and defend in person and with counsel." I.C.§ 19-106. The Idaho Supreme
Court, in State v. Athens, 36 Idaho 224 (1922), has interpreted this statute 3 as providing
a criminal defendant with "the right to appear for himself" without counsel.

State v.

Athens, 36 Idaho at_, 210 P. 133, 134 (1922) ("The same statute that gave him the

right to counsel gave him the right to appear for himself.").
In Mr. Anderson's case, the district court did not hear his motion to represent
himself, instead scheduling it to be heard on Friday, October 25, 2013, however, the
hearing was subsequently vacated without a reason, and never rescheduled. (R., pp.45, 97.) The district court's failure to address Mr. Anderson's request to proceed pro se
was erroneous, as "a motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is
empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay." Fritz v. Spalding, 682
F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982).

As the Ninth Circuit explained, a criminal defendant

"must (however) have a last clear chance to assert his constitutional right . . . before
meaningful trial proceedings have commenced."

Id. (quoting United States v.

Chapman, 553 F.2d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 1977)) (parentheses and ellipsis in original). The

Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that due process requires that a person have
the opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of one of his rights.

See Mays v.

District Court, 34 Idaho 200, _, 20 P. 115, 116 (1921) ("Due process of law requires

The statute referenced in Athens was C.S. § 8621, which was renumbered to I.C. §
19-106 in 1967.

3
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that one be heard before his rights are adjudged."); Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383,

,

·144 P.2d 194, 196 (1943) ("[D]ue process of law has been variously held to mean a law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial."); Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115 (1983) ("The right to procedural due
process guaranteed under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions requires that
a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.").
Here, no finding was made that Mr. Anderson's attempt to exercise his right to
represent himself was made for the purpose of delay where the request was made on
October 21, 2013, several weeks before the trial was initially scheduled to begin on
November 12, 2013. Further, neither party voiced concerns regarding Mr. Anderson's
desire to proceed prose and the upcoming trial date. (See generally 10/21/13 Tr.) For
the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Anderson asserts he was not given the meaningful
opportunity to be heard required under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions
before his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was impliedly denied by the
district court. His case must therefore be remanded for a new trial.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Failed to Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Anderson
And His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Anderson's Request For Substitute Counsel Thereby
Depriving Him Of His Right To Counsel Protected By The Sixth And Fourteenth
Amendments Of The United States Constitution As Well As Article I,§ 13 Of The Idaho
Constitution
A.

Introduction
Although Mr. Anderson filed a lengthy memorandum in support of his motion for

new counsel, the district court did not reference the information contained therein when
speaking to the parties. After Mr. Nelson advised the district court that Mr. Anderson
9

clearly did not want Mr. Nelson to represent him, and that Mr. Anderson wanted to
represent himself, the district court inquired of Mr. Anderson. 4 (3/28/14 T~., p.6, L.14 p.7, L.3.)

When Mr. Anderson began explaining that he had originally wanted to

represent himself, the district court stopped him, and limited Mr. Anderson in his
response to what remedy Mr. Anderson wanted-to represent himself, to hire another
attorney, or to ask for public defender representation. (3/28/14 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.11, 7.)
The district court then asked Mr. Anderson's attorney, Doug Nelson, whether he was
prepared to advocate for an appropriate sentence for Mr. Anderson. (3/28/14 Tr., p.11,
L.22 - p.12, L.1.) The district court did not delve into the problems Mr. Anderson had
been having with his counsel before it denied Mr. Anderson the opportunity to address
the conflict any further.

This failure to provide Mr. Anderson with a full and fair

opportunity to present the facts in support of his request for substitute counsel deprived
him of his right to counsel protected by both the federal and Idaho Constitutions. As
such, Mr. Anderson's case must be remanded to the district court in order for the court
to conduct the constitutionally mandated hearing in order to determine whether good
cause exists for the appointment of substitute counsel and for any further proceedings
that may be necessary as a result of the trial court's determination.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of
Mr. Anderson And His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Anderson's Request For
Appointment Of Substitute Counsel
At the sentencing hearing, when Mr. Anderson was given a chance to address

the district court, the district court limited Mr. Anderson's response to what remedy

Mr. Nelson said, "[S]o it's clear that he doesn't either want me and he wants to
represent himself - I think that's where we are now. And so once this gets filed I don't
think I can continue to ethically represent him, when he's essentially filed a lawsuit or
will file a lawsuit alleging that I don't know what I'm doing." (3/28/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-25.)
4
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Mr. Anderson wanted-to represent himself, to hire another attorney, or to ask for public
defender representation.

The district court did not ask Mr. Anderson to address the

problems he had been having with his counsel and which he had identified in his motion
to dismiss.

This failure to provide Mr. Anderson with a full and fair opportunity to

present the facts in support of his request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right
to counsel protected by both the federal and Idaho Constitutions.
Prior to his sentencing hearing, Mr. Anderson filed a written motion to dismiss his
counsel for being ineffective.

(R., pp.277-281.)

The motion focused on his trial

counsel's actions (or failures to act) at trial. (R., pp.277-280.) Mr. Anderson's defense
counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. (R., pp.282-283.) During
the sentencing hearing, the district court elicited information from defense counsel
regarding his motion to withdraw as counsel.

(3/28/14 Tr., p.5, L.12 - p.6, L.25.)

However, rather than asking Mr. Anderson about the concerns outlined in the Motion to
Dismiss Counsel, including the fact that trial counsel did not accept phone calls from
Mr. Anderson and failed to interview witnesses identified by Mr. Anderson, the district
court instead asked Mr. Anderson what he wanted to do, since he obviously didn't want
Mr. Nelson as his counsel. (3/28/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Anderson began by reminding
the court that he had asked to represent himself previously but that request was denied.
(3/28/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-16.) When Mr. Anderson attempted to make the district court
aware of how he felt his previous counsel had failed him, the district court cut him off
and asked if he wanted someone from the public defender's office to represent him at
sentencing. (3/28/13 Tr., p.7, L.6 - p.9, L.12.) After Mr. Anderson declined the public
defender, then said that he didn't want to represent himself, and finally acquiesced to
the public defender, the district court then turned to trial counsel and asked trial counsel

11

if he felt he would be able to go forward representing Mr. Anderson. (3/28/14 Tr., p.9,
L.13 -- p.12, L.1; R., pp.278-279.)

Once defense counsel admitted that he could

represent Mr. Anderson at the sentencing hearing, the district court denied both motions
and proceeded to sentence Mr. Anderson. (3/28/14 Tr., p.12, L.2 - p.13, L.8.)
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court failed to conduct the full and fair
hearing required by law upon his request for substitute counsel, and that a remand of
his case is therefore appropriate so that the trial court may properly determine whether
there exists good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel.
Both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
and Art. I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel for criminal
defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456
(1967); State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). The right of an indigent
defendant to counsel encompasses the right to effective assistance of counsel. State v.
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897 (1980).

Regardless of whether counsel is retained or

appointed, a criminal defendant has a right to conflict-free counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).

However, the right to counsel does not necessarily

encompass the right to counsel of one's own choosing.

Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594.

"Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for
substitute counsel in absence of extraordinary circumstances."

Id.

However, a trial

court has discretion to appoint substitute counsel for good cause. Clayton, 100 Idaho at
897; State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713 (Ct. App. 1997). This Court reviews the district
court's determination as to whether to appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715 (2002).

12

Where a defendant requests substitute counsel, the district court is under no
obligation to affirmatively act as an advocate for the defendant in determining whether
to appoint substitute counsel. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898. But the court nevertheless
must afford the defendant a full and fair hearing on the request for substitute counsel.
Id.

This is the case even where the trial court maintains some initial skepticism as to
the basis for the defendant's request. As was noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in
State v. Peck, "even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative

tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries necessary to protect a defendant's
constitutional rights." 130 Idaho 711,714 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting U.S. v. Welty, 674
F.2d 185, 189 (3rd Cir. 1982)).
The Idaho Supreme Court case of Nath, supra, is particularly instructive, given
the nature of the district court's response to Mr. Anderson's request for substitute
counsel in this case. In Nath, the Court held that the trial court failed to conduct the
mandated inquiry upon the defendant's request for substitute counsel. Nath, 137 Idaho
at 714-715. The defendant in Nath requested substitute counsel due to the fact that trial
counsel had failed to investigate certain potential witnesses and failed to obtain the
documents requested by the defendant.

Id.

In response, the district court did not

review the totality of the defendant's claims but merely characterized the defendant's
dissatisfactions with counsel as a complaint that his trial counsel was not following the
defendant's requests and instructions. Id. Because the trial court did not provide the
defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his reasons for seeking substitute
counsel, and because the trial court's "review of this motion did not encompass the
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totality of [the defendant's] claims," the Court in Nath held that the trial court failed to
provide the defendant with the required full and fair hearing on his request. Id.
In this case, Mr. Anderson prepared and filed a document outlining his issues
with his counsel and arguably presented a strong claim for substitution of his appointed
counsel. (R., pp.277-280.) Like the defendant in Nath, Mr. Anderson identified to the
court evidence in relation to his trial proceedings that he had asked defense counsel to
procure, but that was never collected and witnesses who were not interviewed.
(R., pp.278-280.) But Mr. Anderson identified a far more serious issue with his counsel.

Namely, that counsel did not accept telephone calls from Mr. Anderson.

(R., p.279.)

However, the district court did not question either Mr. Anderson or his counsel as to the
specifics of Mr. Anderson's document asserting that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance. The lack of analysis by the district court is strikingly similar to the district
court's process in Nath where the district court did not review the totality of the
defendant's claims but merely characterized the defendant's dissatisfactions with
counsel as a complaint that his trial counsel was not following the defendant's requests
and instructions. Id. at 715. The Court in Nath held that because the trial court did not
provide the defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his reasons for seeking
substitute counsel, and because the trial court's "review of this motion did not
encompass the totality of [the defendant's] claims," the trial court failed to provide the
defendant with the required full and fair hearing on his request. Id. at 715.
Here, like in Nath, the defendant filed a document explaining issues and
problems he experienced with his counsel.

Here, just as in Nath, the district court

conducted an incomplete assessment of the request and apparently failed to
understand the totality of Mr. Anderson's claims. Thus the proper remedy is for this
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Court to vacate

Mr. Anderson's conviction

and

remand

the case for further

consideration of the request for substitute counsel.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Appoint Substitute Counsel For
Mr. Anderson
Even assuming arguendo that the district court provided Mr. Anderson an

adequate hearing on his request for substitute counsel, Mr. Anderson asserts that the
denial of his request for appointment of substitute counsel was an abuse of discretion. 5
As previously noted, it is a matter of the trial court's discretion whether to grant a
request for substitute counsel.

Nath, 137 Idaho at 714-715.

This Court reviews a

discretionary determination of the trial court for whether the court: ('1) correctly
perceived the issue as one within the trial court's discretion, (2) acted within the
boundaries of that discretion and consistently with the legal standards attendant to the
choices available to the court; and (3) reached its decision through the exercise of
reason. See, e.g., Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 627 (2010). Mr. Anderson asserts
that the district court's denial of his motion for substitute counsel was an abuse of
discretion because the basis for the court's determination was not consistent with the
legal standards applicable to Mr. Anderson's request, and because the court did not
reach this determination through an exercise of reason.

Although Mr. Anderson is challenging the district court's failure to conduct an
adequate inquiry as to Mr. Anderson's request for substitute counsel at his sentencing
proceeding and failure to appoint substitute counsel, he is not raising a direct claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at this time and reserves the right to bring any such
claims through a petition seeking post-conviction relief. See Lippert, 145 Idaho at 597
n.4 ("We note that Lippert will not be precluded from bringing an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding because ineffective assistance of
counsel is a separate issue from whether he was entitled to substitute counsel.").
5
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The standard set forth by statute for the appointment of substitute counsel is
whether there is "good cause" to appoint a substitute attorney. In Lippert, the Court of
Appeals held that that case should be remanded in order for the district court to conduct
a hearing into the defendant's complaints. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596. "At the hearing,
the district court must conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Lippert
possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first
day of trial."

Id.

"Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete,

irrevocable breakdown of communications; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to
an apparently unjust verdict." Id. In making this determination:
[T]he court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of
the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound
discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her
Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. Even when
the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous
and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.
Id. at 596 (quoting State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,962 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
In addition, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying the request for substitute
counsel where the denial of the motion results in a violation of the defendant's right to
adequate representation of counsel.

Nath, 137 Idaho at 715.

Therefore, where the

defendant establishes that appointed counsel is not fulfilling the constitutional
obligations of counsel to which the defendant is entitled, it is an abuse of discretion to
deny a request for substitute counsel.
Here, just before his sentencing hearing, Mr. Anderson filed a motion to
terminate his counsel, Mr. Nelson. (R., pp.277-281.) The motion explained in detail
why Mr. Anderson believed his trial counsel, Mr. Nelson, was ineffective and why he
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was therefore seeking new counsel. (R., pp.277-280.) Mr. Nelson also filed a motion to
withdraw from representation. (R., pp.282-283.) At the sentencing hearing, 1\/lr. Nelson
advised the district court that 1\/lr. Anderson had showed him a pleading in which
1\/lr. Anderson asserted that 1\/lr. Nelson was ineffective. (3/28/14 Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.6,

L 13.) Mr. Nelson told the district court that once the document was filed, "I don't think I
can continue to ethically represent him, when he's essentially filed a lawsuit or will file a
lawsuit alleging that I don't know what I'm doing." (3/28/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.22-25.) When
offered an opportunity to speak, Mr. Anderson reminded the district court that he had
wanted to represent himself at first but was denied that right, and also expressed
dissatisfaction with his prior counsel, Ben Andersen. (3/28/14 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.8, L.5.)
The district court then asked Mr. Anderson if he wanted to represent himself or if he
wanted different counsel, to which Mr. Anderson responded that he wanted different
counsel to be appointed to represent him. (3/28/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-4, p.11, Ls.2-7.) The
district court then inquired further of Mr. Nelson, "Mr. Nelson, I understand the position
you are in.

My question to you directly is:

Are you prepared today to advocate on

behalf of Mr. Anderson to this court what the appropriate sentence in this case should
be from your client's standpoint?"

(3/28/14 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.1.)

Mr. Nelson

responded to the question affirmatively, and the district court subsequently denied
Mr. Anderson's motion to terminate his counsel and Mr. Nelson's motion to withdraw.
(3/28/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-5.)
The district court provided the following as its reasoning for denying the two
motions:
THE COURT: Here are the reasons that I am making this decision: We
are here today to do one very simple thing - very simple in terms of at
least procedure - Mr. Hatch is going to tell me what the state wants in
terms of a sentence in this case. We have the record. Nobody has
17

indicated there's any reason to offer evidence for further investigation or
anything else. The defense is going to tell me what their position is and
what their recommendations are and then I'm going to make a decision as
to what sentence to impose in this case. I see no purpose to be served
whatsoever by further delaying this case.
The second reason that I am denying both of these motions at this time is
that I am making a very specific finding, Mr. Anderson, that you are
continuing to abuse the public defender system of this county, you are
playing games with this court. The history in Case Number 154 and all of
the things that you just talked about with Mr. Anderson are perfectly
illustrative of the fact that you asked for public defender representation
and then you get into a conflict with them of your own creation, and then
you come in and complain to this court about that, you complain about
your attorneys, and you're doing the same thing today. I find this is an
unacceptable delay in these proceedings. It's time to get this case
resolved, let you go through the appellate process and the post-conviction
process. And that's why I'm denying these motions.
(3/28/14 Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.6.)

Rather than recognizing the issues set forth in

Mr. Anderson's memorandum as impacting his constitutionally guaranteed right to the
effective assistance of counsel, the district court merely dismissed his claims on two
bases - both of which were in error. Instead of inquiring further and also questioning
appointed counsel about the specific allegations by Mr. Anderson, the district court
merely asked counsel if he was prepared to advocate for Mr. Anderson at the
sentencing hearing that day.

Essentially, the district court denied to the motions to

prevent further delay of the case.

Like the Court in Lipperl, this Court is therefore

unable to determine whether Mr. Anderson's complaints were valid.
Because the district court's consideration of the delay that would be the result of
assigning new counsel was not the proper legal standard and because the district court
failed to consider the written bases for Mr. Anderson's motion, the court's denial of
Mr. Anderson's request for substitute counsel was error.
Based upon the written representations made by Mr. Anderson to the trial court,
he established good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel, and the district
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court abused its discretion in denying this request. Accordingly, he asks that this Court
vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence and the order denying his motion to
dismiss his counsel, and remand this case for further proceedings.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Anderson To A
Unified Sentence Of Twelve Years, With Four Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty
To Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Mr. Anderson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
twelve years, with four years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Anderson does not allege
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Mr. Anderson's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact
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that, with programming, Mr. Anderson could likely be successful in the community.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl), 6 p.18.)

Although the prosecutor

used in aggravation the fact that Mr. Anderson was charged with a new possession
crime during the pendency of this case, such does not demonstrate that Mr. Anderson
would be unamenable to rehabilitation, but simply supports the presentencing
investigator's conclusion that Mr. Anderson would benefit from treatment.

(3/28/14

Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24; PSI, p.18.)
Mr. Anderson has not had an easy life.

Mr. Anderson was verbally and

physically abused by both of his parents. (PSI, p.13.) He left home at age twelve and
rode trains to different states and worked in fields to provide for himself. (PSI, pp.13,
18.)
However, Mr. Anderson values his children and enjoys spending time with his
grandchildren.

(PSI, pp.13-14, 17.)

Further, he has the support of members of his

community. (PSI, pp.41, 51-53.) The fact that Mr. Anderson has strong support from
family members and friends should have received the attention of the district court. See

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who
had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his difficult childhood and his dedication to
his family, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

6

References to the "PSI" shall include the entire electronic file, including all attachments
such as letters in support, substance abuse evaluations.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this

Court vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a new trial at which his right to
self-representation is honored. In the alternative, Mr. Anderson requests that his case
be remanded to the district court in order for the court to conduct the constitutionally
mandated hearing to determine whether good cause exists for the appointment of
substitute counsel and for any further proceedings that may be necessary as a result of
the trial court's determination.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court

reduce his sentence or vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 26

th

day of December, 2014.

SALLY i, COOLEY
Deputy State Appell e Public Defender
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